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This paper provides evidence on the relationship between finance and growth in a fast 
growing country, such as China. Employing data of 27 Chinese provinces over the 
period 1995-2003, we study whether the financial development of two different types 
of  institutions  –  banks  and  non-bank  financial  institutions  –  have  a  (significantly 
different) impact on local economic growth. Our findings indicate that only banking 
development shows a statistically significant and economically  relevant  impact  on 
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I. Introduction   
 
Financial  development  plays  an  important  role  in  promoting  the  growth  of  many 
countries. An under-researched question, however, is whether finance is an important 
driver of growth in countries exhibiting high growth rates. In this paper we address 
this  “finance-high-growth-rate”  nexus  by  studying  the  recent  economic  growth  of 
Chinese provinces.   
 
China, being one of the most important developing countries in the world, exhibited 
an average real growth rate of 9 percent per year during the last two decades. China’s 
experience therefore may be relevant for other countries with similar growth potential. 
China’s finance-high-growth-rate nexus only recently received attention; however, no 
consensus on the role of finance has been reached yet. One strand of papers argues 
that financial development matters for economic growth by observing that financial 
development is significantly correlated with local growth (e.g. Li and Liu (2001) and 
Zhou  and  Wang  (2002)).  Another  strand  of  papers  reasons  that  China  is  a 
counterexample to the current findings of the finance and growth literature (e.g., Allen 
et al. (2005), and Boyreau-Debray (2003)). Allen et al. (2005) conclude that there 
exist  other  financing  channels  for  the  private  sector  than  those  of  financial 
institutions.   
 
In  addressing  the  finance-high-growth-rate  nexus,  we  deal  with  the  role  different 
financial  institutions  may  play  –  bank  and  non-bank  financial  institutions.  Banks 
typically  are  state-owned,  large,  operate  nationwide,  and  have  many  branches. 
Non-bank financial institutions, in contrast, operate locally within the province and   4
are  much  smaller
1.    Banks  are  generally  technologically  more  advanced,  better 
developed and dominate the financial system. Banks, however, are known for their 
reluctance to grant loans to small private companies (Allen et al. (2005)), while most 
loans of non-bank financial institutions are extended to the non-state-owned sector 
(Xie  (1998)).  The  fact  that  bank  and  non-bank  financial  institutions  show  clear 
differences  calls  for  a  separate  treatment.  Employing  a  generalized 
“difference-in-differences” method, we compare the impact of the development  of 
bank and non-bank financial institutions on Chinese provinces’ growth rates over the 
period 1995-2003. Our results indicate that only bank loans exert a statistically and 
economically significant positive impact on local economic growth.   
 
Identifying the effects of financial development on economic growth is a challenging 
task in that financial development may react to the expectation of enhanced future 
economic growth; hence economies with good growth prospects develop institutions 
to  provide  funds  necessary  to  support  those  good  prospects  (Robinson  (1952)). 
Focusing  on  one  country  only,  in  our  case  China,  allows  us  to  make  progress  in 
controlling for this reverse causality. First, the Chinese economy with its different 
types of financial institutions allows taking a generalized “difference-in-differences” 
method,  which  helps  in  identifying  the  causation.  The  rationale  for  this  approach 
stems  from  the  following  reasoning.  Theory  argues  that  financial  institutions 
efficiently  allocate  capital  to  where  it  can  generate  better  returns  and  therefore 
promote growth. Then, banks exhibiting a greater efficiency than non-bank financial 
                                                        
1  Banks in our study include the five biggest commercial banks in China: the four biggest state-owned 
commercial banks and one national commercial bank, Bank of Communications. Non-bank financial 
institutions mainly include rural credit cooperatives, and local trust and investment companies. For the 
detailed differences between those institutions, we refer to the third section.   5
institutions  may  be  better  at  selecting  fast  growing  firms.  Empirically  we  should 
observe a stronger  correlation between  banking development and future economic 
growth. However, if finance simply follows growth, the huge demand for funds from 
the  non-state-owned  enterprises  due  to  their  growing  needs  will  make  the 
development of non-bank financial institutions show a stronger correlation with future 
growth. 
 
Second, we study growth over 1995-2003, a period immediately after the Chinese 
government  tried  to  “soft  land”  the  economy.  The  growth  rates  have  shown  a 
decreasing trend during this sample period. When economic growth leads finance, the 
situation should be less severe during the downswing of the business cycle. Typically, 
we find that the fastest growing provinces in our sample are not those that exhibit the 
greatest increase in financial development.   
 
Last,  we  also  apply  the  dynamic  system  GMM  estimator  to  control  for  potential 
endogeneity and find that our results remain robust. 
 
Putting  all  evidence  together,  we  conclude that  the  significant positive correlation 
more likely stems from banking development spurring local growth, rather than the 
other way around. As a comparison, non-bank financial institutions, while granting 
most of their loans to the non-state-owned sector, seem to be less important for local 
growth. This suggests that, despite the relatively weak Chinese financial sector, the 
efficiency of financial institutions still plays an important role in the allocation of 
funds, and in turn spurs growth. 
   6
How to reconcile these results with Allen et al. (2005), who argue that growth in 
China mainly stems from the private sector? First, Chinese banks may enjoy a better 
pool of borrowers. Banks can select first from the borrower pool; borrowers prefer to 
borrow from banks because bank loans, especially short-term loans, are less costly 
than other financial instruments. Banks also have a larger geographical scope, and 
face fewer restrictions in attracting deposits. As a result, banks can establish stronger 
bank-firm relationships, and finance both large and small firms. Non-bank financial 
institutions  may  have  a  restricted  choice  due  to  their  smaller  nature.  Second,  we 
notice that the state-owned sector still contributed around 40% of GDP growth in 
recent years (Sun (2004)). As banks can to some extent screen good borrowers from 
bad and allocate the capital to profitable state-owned enterprises (Cull and Xu (2000)), 
bank loans are still very important in supporting local industrial growth. Third, bank 
loans  and  especially  short-term  loans  to  the  non-state-owned  sector,  have  grown 
considerably  during  our  sample  period.  This  suggests  that  banks  increased  their 
relative exposure towards the financing of private firms, even though most financed 
private firms  were large ones.  This noticeable change is also documented by two 
recent surveys (see Appendix), which indicate that Chinese banks are more likely to 
discriminate  borrowers  with  respect  to  their  sizes  rather  than  ownership.  Finally, 
another plausible explanation is that bank loans may be transmitted to the private 
sector through state-owned enterprises. Lu and Yao (2004) argue that given the weak 
legal enforcement, Chinese banks may prefer to grant loans to state-owned enterprises 
that reinvest bank loans in the private sector.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the 
finance  and  growth  literature.  Section  III  describes  the  Chinese  financial  system,   7
focusing on the two types of financial institutions. Section IV presents our empirical 




II  Financial  Development  and  Economic  Growth:  Theory  and 
Evidence 
 
Theory has studied the relationship between finance and growth. In general there are 
two  schools  of  thought  with  contrasting  views.  One  school  holds  the  idea  that 
financial development follows rather than spurs economic growth. Robinson (1952) 
argues that finance does not cause growth, but reacts to the demand from the real 
sector. Hence economies with good growth prospects develop institutions to provide 
the necessary funds to support those good prospects.   
 
The other school argues that financial development plays a key role for growth. First, 
financial  intermediation  economizes  the  costs  associated  with  mobilizing  savings 
(Boyd and Smith (1992) and Sirri and Tufano (1995)), and therefore increases capital 
accumulation. Second, financial intermediaries evaluate firms, managers and market 
conditions,  and  reallocate  capital  to  its  best  use  (Boyd  and  Prescott  (1986), 
Greenwood  and  Jovanovic  (1990),  and  Allen  (1990)).  Moreover,  financial 
intermediaries  monitor  firms  and  exert  control  to  overcome  agency  problems 
(Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Boyd and Smith (1994)). Financial 
intermediation meanwhile diversifies investment risks, which enhances the output and 
in turn economic growth (Gurley and Shaw (1955), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990)   8
and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)). In their view, differences in the quantity and 
quality  of  services  provided  by  financial  institutions  partly  explain  why  countries 
grow at different rates (Goldsmith (1969), Mckinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973)).   
 
The recent literature also integrates financial development in innovation-based growth 
models. For instance, King and Levine (1993b) suggest that financial intermediaries 
can evaluate, finance and monitor potential entrepreneurs in their innovative activities. 
They  also  show  that  the  relationship  between  finance  and  growth  is  likely  to  be 
dynamic and endogenous. Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkers (2003) show why the 
existence of technological transfers is not sufficient to put all countries on parallel 
long-run growth rate paths. They find that it is not just financial constraints that make 
some  countries  poor  but  rather  that  financial  constraints  inhibit  a  technological 
transfer and thus lead to an ever-increasing technology gap.   
 
Recent  empirical  evidence  employing  cross-country  datasets  show  that  finance  is 
positively correlated with growth. King and Levine (1993a) use data on 80 countries 
over  the  period  1960-1989,  to  document  that  the  level  of  financial  development 
determines long-run economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth. 
Levine and Zervos (1998) refine this and find that initial stock market liquidity and 
banking development are both positively correlated with future rates of economic and 
productivity growth in a sample of 42 countries over the period 1976-1993.   
 
The  initial  cross-country  studies  may  suffer  from  simultaneity  bias.  More  recent 
studies therefore focus on finding proper instruments to extract the exogenous part of 
financial development when trying to deal with the issue of causality. La Porta et al   9
(1998) link the legal origin of a country to its financial development. Their empirical 
results  suggest  that  a  variety  of  legal  origins  (British,  French,  German  or 
Scandinavian laws) differing in protecting the rights of shareholders and creditors and 
in the efficiency of legal enforcement, reasonably lead to different levels of financial 
development.  Based  upon  the  above  legal  origin-finance  instruments  and  using 
cross-country  datasets,  a  substantial  body  of  empirical  work  further  shows  that 
financial  development  promotes  economic  growth  in  aggregate,  industry  and  firm 
level  analysis  (see  e.g.  Levine,  Loayza,  and  Beck  (2000)  or  Demirgüç-Kunt  and 
Maksimovic (1998)). Next to instruments such as legal origin, economists also rely on 
improved econometric techniques to instrument endogenous variables. Authors use 
the dynamic system GMM panel estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), to 
extract the impact of financial development on economic growth by controlling for 
potential endogeneity.   
 
One way to control for cross-country differences such as legal origin is to focus on 
one country only. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) tackle the endogeneity problem by 
keeping  effects  other  than  financial  development  constant.  They  use  financial 
deregulation  in  the  early  1970s  in  35  U.S.-states  as  an  exogenous  shock  to  local 
financial  development.  They  find  that  in  the  30  years  after  the  deregulation,  the 
economy grew faster in the deregulated states than in the other states. They also test 
the hypothesis of deregulation happening only due to expectation about the future 
needs  of  financing.  They  reject  this  hypothesis  by  observing  that  the  loans  after 
deregulation did not explode. Therefore, they attribute the relatively faster economic 
growth in the deregulated states to the improvements in loan quality. Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales (2004) study the effects of differences in local financial development on   10
economic activity in Italy. They find that local financial development enhances the 
probability that an individual starts a business, increases industrial competition, and in 
turn spurs firm growth. 
 
Only few studies consider developing countries. Haber (1991, 1997) examines the 
role  of  financial  liberalization  for  economic  growth  in  Brazil  and  Mexico.  He 
documents  that  financial  liberalization allows  more  firms  to  have  better  access  to 
external  finance.  He  argues  that  political  institutions  play  an  important  role  in 
determining the degree of financial liberalization, and concludes that Brazil did better 
in financial liberalization due to its better political institutions. 
 
The  finance  and  growth  issue  in  China  received  attention  only  recently  but  no 
consensus has been reached yet. One strand of papers holds the view that finance 
promotes  growth  in  China.  Employing  a  province-level  dataset  for  the  period 
1985-1998,  Liu  and  Li  (2001)  find  that  growth  of  provincial  aggregate  output  is 
positively related to the growth of the loans of the largest banking institutions and self 
raised  funds.  They  attribute  the  positive  correlation  to  the  improvement  in  the 
efficiency of capital reallocation during the liberalization in both financial and real 
sectors. Zhou and Wang (2002) study the impact of local financial development on 
economic growth, using a provincial dataset over the period 1978-2000, and find that 
local financial development is highly correlated with economic growth. Moreover, the 
provinces  with  relatively  low  initial  level  of  financial  development  show  slower 
growth rates afterwards. Particularly, they attribute the significant correlation between 
finance and growth to the openness of local financial markets, which improves the 
competition as well as the efficiency of financial institutions. However, those papers   11
do not formally deal with the endogeneity of finance and growth and hence to some 
extent their conclusion of the causality is less convincing.   
 
The other strand of papers holds the opinion that China is a counterexample of the 
finance-growth nexus (e.g. Allen et al. (2005), and Boyreau-Debray (2003)). Allen et 
al. (2005) question whether financial development plays an important role for China’s 
growth, as they observe the coexistence of weak Chinese legal and financial systems 
and  fast  economic  growth.  They  examine  closely  the  relationship  between  law, 
finance  and  growth  in  China.  Their  analysis  reveals  that  the  relatively  poor  legal 
system and the underdeveloped financial sector contribute little to the growth of the 
private  sector,  which  is  known  as  the  most  important  component  of  China’s  fast 
growth. Hence, Allen et al. (2005) argue that there exist other financing channels for 
the private sector than those of financial institutions. 
 
 
III. The Chinese financial system   
 
3.1 The Chinese financial structure 
 
In  this  section,  we  offer  a  description  of  the  Chinese  financial  structure.
2  We 
explicitly focus on the differently developed financial institutions in China – banks 
and non-bank financial institutions, rather than stock markets. The reasoning is that 
the Chinese financial system is dominated by financial institutions, especially banks.
3 
                                                        
2  Table a1 in Appendix introduces the functions of the main Chinese financial institutions. 
3  For example, at the end of 1994, the ratio of the stock market capitalization to total assets of financial institutions   12
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 presents the structure of the Chinese financial system at the end of 1994. It 
shows that financial institutions in China can be separated in two categories: banks 
and non-bank financial institutions. The banking sector (labeled as “banks”) entails 
three policy banks – focusing on policy-oriented loans – and fifteen commercial banks, 
of which the four state-owned commercial banks are, in terms of assets, by far the 
most  important.  Among  the  eleven  national  and  regional  banks,  Bank  of 
Communications
4   is  the  largest  with  China’s  finance  ministry  as  its  largest 
shareholder. Researchers often refer to the four state-owned banks and the Bank of 
Communications  as  “the  five  biggest  state-owned  banks”.  The  non-bank  financial 
sector (labeled as “non-bank financial institutions”) consists of urban and rural credit 
cooperatives,  trust  and  investment  companies,  financial  companies  and  other 
institutions.   
 
Banks  are  hierarchically  organized  while  non-bank  institutions  are  generally 
following a “decentralized form”. This hierarchical structure mainly stems from their 
size. For example, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the largest state-owned 
bank has 37,039 branches all over the country. As a comparison, there are 50,745 rural 
credit cooperatives in China. Rural credit cooperatives either have a so-called “united 
                                                                                                                                                               
was approximately 6.7%. Although the importance of stock markets has increased somewhat since the early 1990s, 
the  scale  and  the  importance  of  the  financing  channels  of  the  stock  markets  are  not  comparable  to  those  of 
financial  institutions  (Allen  et  al.  (2005)).  In  this  paper,  we  assume  that  stock  markets  have  no  significantly 
different impacts on different provinces. Hence employing a fixed effects panel model and incorporating time 
dummy variable in our analysis may well control for the impact of stock markets.   
4  The Bank of Communications has been publicly listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange since June 2005.     13
headquarter”  in  the  county,  or  are  independent  from  each  other.  One  rural  credit 
cooperative is typically active in one county only. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, the total assets of the four state-owned banks, which were 
approximately 7,122 billion RMB
5  at the end of 1994, cover around 78 percent of the 
total assets of the entire financial sector. The other banks are much smaller. As the 
fifth biggest bank in China, Bank of Communications occupied more than half of the 
total  assets  of  all  national  and  regional  banks  at  the  end  of  1994.  The  non-bank 
financial institutions together took 16 percent of the assets of all financial institutions. 
The market share of rural credit cooperatives was 7 percent, which was comparable to 
that of trust and investment companies. At the end of 2002, state-owned banks still 
dominated but their market share declined towards 68 percent. National and regional 
banks  gained  market  share  towards  15  percent.  Market  share  of  rural  credit 
cooperatives  increased  whereas  trust  and  investment  companies’  market  share 
decreased. 
 
We argue that the two types of financial institutions – banks and non-bank financial 
institutions – differ  in several  dimensions, and their financial development should 
therefore be treated separately. First, they have a diverging geographical scope. Banks 
are  bigger  players  than  non-bank  financial  institutions.  Most  banks  in  China  are 
national  or  regional  players,  and  some  of  them  are  even  international  players.  A 
non-bank financial institution, in contrast, is typically present in one province only. 
                                                        
5  RMB=Renminbi (in 2000, 1 US $ = 8.3 RMB)   14
Second, banks are technological more advanced. Banks often pay higher salaries and 
offer  better  career  opportunities  to  young  graduates.  Therefore,  banks  may  attract 
higher quality personnel. Banks also benefit more easily from technological spillovers, 
as  they  recruit  experts  having  overseas  working  experience.
6  Third,  large  banks’ 
branches benefit from credit systems developed centrally. Most banks in China have 
set up their credit center to analyze the credit risk of their borrowers. Although a 
hierarchical structure also has clear disadvantages and may imply a focus on hard 
information as argued by Stein (2002), banks in emerging countries may still benefit 
from  such  organizational  structure as  it helps  in  reducing  asymmetric information 
problems. Stand-alone non-bank financial institutions are more likely to suffer from 
asymmetric information in the Chinese financial system. The reasoning is that there is 
no  third-party  credit  rating  agency.  The  presence  of  high-quality  personnel  and  a 
centrally developed credit rating system may help banks to better distinguish good 
from bad borrowers, in line with the findings of Cull and Xu (2000). 
 
Recent balance sheet data as well as reported data on non-performing loans (NPLs) 
show that banks perform better than non-bank financial institutions. Tables 1 and 2 
offer more information. 
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
                                                        
6  The following statistics may illustrate the differences in educated personnel between banks and non-bank 
financial institutions. At the end of 2002, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China had approximately 18% of its 
personnel holding at least a university degree (Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2003)). Rural credit 
cooperatives, in contrast, had in a typical Chinese city only around 0.1% of its personnel with a university degree 
(He and Li (2006)).   15
Table  1  displays  the  operating  cost  ratios  of  different  types  of  Chinese  financial 
institutions. The ratio of operating costs to assets is lower for banks than for non-bank 
financial institutions. Table 2 provides data on the non-performing loans (NPLs) in the 
Chinese financial sector. Although the average NPL ratio is high compared to other 
countries, banks have a lower NPL ratio than non-bank financial institutions. Wang 
and Li (2004) study rural credit cooperatives in some western provinces in China, and 
find that these cooperatives’ NPL ratio even increased over the period 1997-2002. The 
numbers  presented  in  Table  1  and  2  suggest  that  banks  are  more  efficient  than 
non-bank financial institutions. 
 
3.2 Bank-firm relationships in China 
 
Understanding the formation of bank-firm relationships may help us to gain insights 
into  the  role  of  finance  for  growth.  As  stock  markets  are  not  well  developed  in 
developing economies and emerging markets, firms heavily rely on debt, in particular 
short-term debt, for financing their investments. Hence the short-term loan portfolios 
of Chinese financial institutions may shed light on how different types of firms are 
financed.  Figure  3  and  Table  3  report  how  short-term  credit  has  been  allocated 
between two different types of firms, state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises in 
China, during our sample period. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 and Table 3 here] 
 
Figure  3  displays  the  evolution  of  the  short-term  loan  portfolios  of  financial 
institutions  in  China.  Although  both  state-owned  enterprises  and  non-state-owned   16
enterprises received more short-term credit over the period 1994-2002, the short-term 
loans extended to the non-state-owned sector grew faster. Meanwhile the proportion 
of loans to the state-owned sector decreased from 82.5% in 1994 towards 64.4% in 
2002. Data from BankScope show that the reporting banks’ growth rate of short-term 
loans was larger than the one of the reporting non-bank financial institutions (average 
annual growth rate of 6.6% versus 2.3% respectively over the period 1996-2002). 
This evidence suggests that the growing short-term loans stem more from banks than 
from non-bank financial institutions. 
 
Furthermore,  two  surveys  provide  evidence  on  how  firms  may  choose  between 
different financial institutions (see Appendix: survey a1 and a2). They show that firms 
apply first for credit at banks before turning to non-bank financial institutions or other 
sources of finance. As bank loans are known for their lower loan rate, borrowing from 
banks is less costly than from other institutions. Banks in China may therefore enjoy a 
better pool of borrowers. The two surveys indicate also that at the end of 2002, banks 
in  China  are  more  likely  to  discriminate  according  to  borrowers’  size  rather  than 
ownership. This may stem from the fact that the Chinese banks are used to extent 
loans on the basis of collateral.   
 
 
IV. The growth effects of financial development in China 
 
4.1 Empirical framework and financial development indicators 
 
4.1.1 Empirical framework   17
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
Figure 4 displays the channels through which financial intermediation contributes to 
economic growth in the model of King and Levine (1993b), on which our empirical 
model is based. The model identifies the following potential relationships between 
finance  and  growth.  First,  finance  supports  innovations  and  hence  increases  the 
productivity  which  is  positively  correlated  with  growth.  Second,  efficiency 
improvements in the financial sector, such as a decrease in the cost of monitoring, will 
increase the real rate of return and thus lead to a higher future growth rate. Third, the 
model also suggests a reverse channel of causation where distortions in the innovative 
sector lower the demand for financial services and retard financial development.   
 
To  estimate  the  impact  of financial  development  on economic  growth,  consider  a 
Cobb-Douglas production function at the individual level, 
, x k y
a =                                                             (1) 
where y equals real per capita GDP, k equals real per capita physical capital stock, x 
equals  other  determinants  of  per  capita  growth,  and    is  a  production  function 
parameter. Taking the logarithm of (1) yields, 
 
. ln ln ln x k y + =a                                                     (2) 
As most neo-classical R&D models predict, for example King and Levine (1993b), 
the growth of x comes from technological innovation. First-difference of (2) yields, 
PROD GK GYP + = ) ( a , 
where GYP is the growth rate of real per capita GDP, GK is the growth rate of real per   18
capita capital stock and PROD is the growth rate of everything else. If we assume that 
the hours worked per worker are relatively stable in our sample range, PROD should 
provide a reasonable conglomerate indicator of technology growth. If there is any key 
relationship between technological growth and financial development, for instance, 
efficiency, the contemporaneous impact of finance on growth hence can be estimated 
by, 
  1 2 t o t t t GPY a a GK a FI e = + + +                                     3  
where FIt is the financial development indicator at time t. For an empirical application 
of equation (3) to China’s local province growth, we base our estimation on panel data 
from different provinces over the period 1995-2003. The advantage of using panel 
data is that we can estimate the corresponding relationship even in a relatively short 
period. The fixed effects model derived from equation (3), also controlling for time 
effects can be written as   
, 0 , 1 1 , 2 , 3 , ,
1 1
I T
i t i t i t i t i t i i t t i t
i t
GPY GDP GK FI CON U V a a a a d f e -
= =
= + + + + + + å å  
where  , 1 i t GDP -   is  initial  real  GDP  per  capita  and  FIi,t  is  the  financial  development 
indicator of either banks or non-bank financial institutions in province i at time t. Ui is 
a set of province dummy variables, Vt is the set of time dummy variables, and  i d   and 
t f   are the vectors of coefficients. CON refers to the conditioning informational set. 
CON includes FDI and Investment measured by the ratio of Foreign Direct Investment 
to GDP, and the ratio of total investment to GDP, respectively.   
 
In order to reveal the relationship between financial development and future economic 
growth,  we  introduce  the  lagged  financial  development  indicators  in  our  panel 
regression,   19
 
, 0 , 1 1 , 2 , 1 3 , ,
1 1
I T
i t i t i t i t i t i i t t i t
i t
GPY GDP GK FI CON U V a a a a d f e - -
= =
= + + + + + + å å
7      (4) 
Here equation (4) can be estimated by OLS in general, assuming that the lagged FI is 
exogenous and there is no heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation in the error 
term. However, problems arise when those assumptions are violated. For example, 
heteroskedasticity or serial autocorrelation in the error term is often observed in panel 
analysis. This problem can be solved by introducing robust standard errors or by first 
differencing the data. In our analysis, heteroskedasticity is detected. We report the 
results of regression (4) employing robust standard errors. 
 
Within-country panel analysis alleviates the potential endogeneity problem that most 
cross-country studies may face. It is easier to control for omitted variables that may 
drive both economic growth and financial development. Reverse causality is another 
concern. The significant correlation between finance and growth may not necessarily 
indicate that finance spurs growth, but possibly the reverse. As we argued before, 
examining  two  types  of  financial  institutions  may  also  mitigate  this  problem.  In 
several robustness tests, we deal further with potential endogeneity.   
 
Can we consider Chinese provinces as isolated markets? Boyreau-Debray and Wei 
(2004) show that during the 1951-2001 period, local investment was largely explained 
by local deposits, and thus within-country capital mobility was low. Therefore local 
                                                        
7  Here  we  control  for  the  contemporaneous  effects  of  conditioning  variables,  such  as  FDI  and  Investment, 
following the traditional finance and growth literature (see e.g. King and Levine (1993a)). As a robustness test, we 
also model the finance and growth relationship by controlling for the lagged value of conditioning variables, as 
conventional growth theory suggests. Our results remain robust.   20
capital markets are less influenced by cross-province capital flows. They also point 
out that the Chinese government is likely to reallocate capital to less developed areas. 
Such  reallocation,  however,  takes  capital  away  from  the  more  productive  regions 
towards  the  less  productive  ones.  To  the  extent  that  this  reallocation  takes  place 
through banks, this should work against finding a positive impact of banks’ financial 
development on growth (see also Park and Sehrt (2001)). 
 
4.1.2. Bank and non-bank financial development indicators 
 
We construct three financial development indicators at the province level for banks 
and non-bank financial institutions, respectively. 
 
Indicators of financial development of banks 
 
Bank Deposit equals the ratio of the savings in the banking system to local GDP. Bank 
Deposit  is  a  measure  of  “financial  depth”  of  the  local  banking  sector.  A  second 
indicator  is  Bank  Credit,  which  equals  the  credit  extended  by  banks  to  local 
enterprises over local GDP. This indicator measures the financial resources provided 
by banks to provincial entities. Finally, we construct a measure Bank Concentration, 
which is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
8, employing bank market shares in 
the deposit market and taking the province as the relevant market. We include this 
measure to proxy for the competitiveness of the banking sector. Before 1980, there 
were only 3 banks in China and each of them enjoyed a different segment of the 
deposit market. After 1984, the number of banks in the market increased and banks 
                                                        
8  Although HHI may not be an ideal estimate for the degree of competition, it is so far the best estimate we can 
have in provincial level.   21
began to compete for deposits under the permission of the central government. 
 
Indicators of financial development of non-bank financial institutions 
 
In  a  similar  fashion  as  for  the  bank  indicators,  we  construct  Non-bank  Deposit, 
Non-bank Credit and Non-bank Concentration for non-bank financial institutions.   
 
4.2 Data and empirical results 
 
4.2.1 Data Description 
 
Our dataset contains annual growth rates of real per capita GDP, real per capita capital 
stock,  FDI  and  Investment for  27  Chinese  provinces  over  the  period 1995-2003
9. 
Lagged  financial  development  indicators,  lagged  real  per  capita  GDP,  and  lagged 
infrastructure indicators
10  are also included in our dataset from 1994 to 2002.   
 
The  financial  development  indicators  in  our  study  are  calculated  employing  the 
statistics data reported by Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking. The Almanac 
documents  the  provincial  data  of  annual  savings  and  loans  of  5  banks  only:  4 
state-owned banks and the Bank of Communications, the biggest bank of the national 
commercial banks. At the end of 1994, those 5 banks represent approximately 96 
percent of the total assets of the banking sector. 
 
We start our analysis in 1995 as Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking reports the 
                                                        
9  Data reasons prevent us to include three provinces (Hubei, Tibet and Hainan).   
10  Lagged infrastructure indicators are included in our robustness tests. Detailed illustration in section 4.3.2   22
provincial data of savings and loans of rural credit cooperatives and of some selected 
trust and investment companies, financial companies, and other non-bank financial 
institutions only from 1994 onwards.
11  Only the non-bank financial institutions that 
are considered to be large enough have their data included in the Almanac, whereas 
smaller institutions remain uncovered. This may introduce a reporting bias in that 
provinces  with  many  small  institutions  may  have  an  underestimated  size  of  the 
non-banking  sector.  This  reporting  bias,  however,  should  be  taken care  of  by  our 
province  dummies  in  as  far  the  reporting  bias  remains  constant  over  our  sample 
period within a province.   
 
We  construct  the  non-bank  financial  institutions’  development  indicators  from  the 
annual  provincial  data  of  rural  credit  cooperatives  and  other  reporting  non-bank 
financial institutions. The computation of the non-bank concentration based on the 
aggregate data of Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking also poses some problems. 
While rural credit cooperatives, like other non-bank financial institutions, are isolated 
from each other, Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking reports the province level 
aggregate  for  all  rural  credit  cooperatives  jointly  in  every  province.  However  in 
reality rural credit cooperatives in one province are not “integrated” into one entity. 
Therefore,  the  degree  of  competition  among  non-bank  financial  institutions  is 
estimated by measurement error, which is inevitable given our data limitations. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
                                                        
11  The data of urban credit cooperatives are also reported but not for every year. We therefore decided to exclude 
urban credit cooperatives from our sample.   23
Table 4 provides summary statistics. We present time averages for the 27 provinces. 
Table 4 highlights that there is substantial variation between provinces. The highest 
average annual real per capita GDP growth rate is 10.2 percent (Zhejiang province), 
while the lowest is 5.7 percent (Yunnan province). Shanghai, the richest province in 
China has on average annual real GDP per capita of 15,920 RMB while Yunnan, the 
poorest, has only 1,430 RMB. The financial development indicators for China are 
relatively high compared to those for other countries (see also Allen et al. (2005)). For 
example, the average ratios of Bank Deposit and Bank Credit across provinces are 
0.843 and 0.683, while the average ratios of non-bank savings  and loans to  GDP 
across  provinces  are  0.141  and  0.109  only.  Similarly,  Beijing  on  average  has  the 
highest values of both Bank Deposit and Bank Credit, while Shandong province on 
average has the lowest levels of Bank Deposit and Bank Credit. Non-bank financial 
institutions  exhibit  the  lowest  development  in  Qinghai  province,  while  Shanxi  on 
average  has  the  greatest  Non-bank  Deposit  and  Guangdong  enjoys  the  greatest 
Non-bank Credit. Both Bank Deposit and Bank Credit outweigh those of non-bank 
financial institutions. 
   
4.2.2 Empirical results 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 presents the regression results of different specifications of equation (4). The 
left panel (5a,b and c) displays the results including our bank financial development 
indicators in the regression. Bank Deposit and Bank Credit are significantly positively 
correlated with future economic growth. The middle panel (5d,e and f) presents the   24
results where non-bank financial development indicators enter the regression. None of 
the non-bank financial development indicators is statistically significant. The right 
panel (5g and h) shows the results for the regressions where both bank and non-bank 
financial  development  indicators  enter  the  specification.  The  results  are  robust 
compared  to  the  left  columns  (5a,  b,  d  and  e)  as  only  the  banking  development 
indicators  Bank  Deposit  and  Bank  Credit  are  statistically  significant.  Bank 
Concentration  and  Non-bank  Concentration  are  not  statistically  significant, 
suggesting that either competition in banking markets does not affect growth or HHI 
as indicator for the degree of competition is not proper. 
 
The  bank  and  non-bank  financial  development  indicators  exhibit  a  significant 
different  impact  on  growth  even  though  bank  loans  are  more  focused  on  the 
state-owned sector. As a comparison, although non-bank loans are mostly extended to 
the non-state-owned sector, Non-bank Credit is largely irrelevant in explaining growth. 
This remarkable difference between bank and non-bank financial institutions suggests 
that the loans of the financial sector do not simply follow growth. On the contrary, it 
reveals that financial development plays an important role in promoting local Chinese 
economic growth, as banks compared to non-bank financial institutions have a better 
pool of borrowers, are technologically more advanced. Moreover, banks benefit from 
deregulatory financial reforms. 
 
We  now  turn  to  the  control  variables  as  reported  in  Table  5.  Neither  FDI  nor 
Investment  has  a  significant  impact  on  growth.  This  result  may  stem  from  the 
inclusion of province fixed effects. Therefore, FDI and Investment may not exhibit 
sufficient time-series variation to become significant. Another reason is that as FDI   25
mainly concentrates in certain industries, the growth effect of FDI is not necessarily 
observed at the macro-economic level.  Initial GDP is significantly negative in all 
specifications.  It  captures  the  convergence  effect  of  growth  across  the  Chinese 
provinces. This effect has been documented in previous research dealing with China 
(see e.g. Boyreau-Debray (2003) and Démurger (2001)). The per capita capital stock 
growth is not statistically significant. This insignificance may stem from the fact that 
people move  easier  within a  country  (i.e.  across  provinces) than across countries. 
Hence an empirical application using local data of a country may suffer from the 
problem that the provincial population is quite unstable over time. In Table 6, we 
present the results of regressing provincial aggregate GDP growth on the growth of 
the aggregate capital stock and financial development indicators. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
The aggregate  capital stock  growth is significant  and positive. While Bank Credit 
keeps it positive sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level, Bank Deposit 
now becomes insignificant. 
 
4.3 Robustness tests: endogeneity 
 
4.3.1 Reverse causality 
Are our results driven by reserve causality? That is, does the expectation of future 
growth  prospects  imply  greater  financial  development?  If  this  were  true,  high 
economic  growth  provinces  should  also  exhibit  high  growth  rates  of  financial 
development. We investigate this issue in several ways. First, we select the 13 fastest   26
growing provinces in terms of economic growth. We do find, however, that only 6 of 
them are in the top 13 of fastest growing Bank Deposit or Bank Credit provinces. 
Therefore, high growth provinces are less likely to be provinces that exhibit a high 
growth rate of financial development.   
 
Second,  directly  controlling  for  endogeneity  is  also  possible  when  employing  the 
dynamic  system  GMM  estimator  proposed  by  Arellano  and  Bover  (1995).  The 
dynamic panel model requires the lagged dependent variable to enter to right-hand 
side of the regression. For example, regression (4) can be extended to a dynamic panel 
regression as follows,     
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A system estimator jointly estimates the regression in levels (5) and the regression in 
differences (6). In order to correct for endogeneity, Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest 
employing lagged first differences of the explanatory variables as instruments for the 
equation in levels (5) and the lagged values of the explanatory variables in levels as 
instruments for the equation in differences (6). The crucial assumptions therefore are 
that  the  lagged  differences  of  variables  are  good  instruments  for  explaining 
subsequent  levels  and  the  lagged  levels  of  variables  are  good  instruments  for   27
explaining  subsequent  first  differences.  Rejection  of  the  Sargan  test  of 
over-identifying  restrictions  at  5%  level  however  questions  the  validity  of  those 
instruments.  It  is  also  necessary  to  test  whether  the  error  term  of  regression  (6), 
, , 1 i t i t e e - - , is second-order serially autocorrelated. Accepting the null hypothesis of 
no  second-order  serial  autocorrelation  supports  the  assumption  of  the  moment 
condition of (6). 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Table 7 reports the impact of financial development on economic growth when using 
the  dynamic  system  GMM  estimator.  Bank  Credit  significantly  spurs  economic 
growth, both economically and statistically. For example, if Shandong, the province 
now receiving the least bank credit enjoyed as much bank credit as Beijing, where the 
most bank credit is extended, ceteris paribus, Shandong’s growth rate would increase 
approximately 6 percent per year, which is huge. Column 7h displays the results when 
we  include  Bank  Credit  and  Non-bank  Credit  in  one  regression.  Again,  only  the 
impact  of  Bank  Credit appears  to  be  positive  and  significant.  Bank  Deposit  turns 
statistically  insignificant.  The  coefficients  of  Bank  Concentration  and  Non-bank 
Concentration are significant but are much less robust than other results in different 
specifications  and  should  therefore  be  taken  with  care.  The  fact  that  the  null 
hypotheses of both the Sargan test and the second-order serial autocorrelation tests 
cannot  be  rejected  at  the  5  percent  level  approves  the  validity  of  the  results  of 
dynamic panel regressions.   
   
4.3.2 Omitted variables   28
 
Endogeneity  may  arise  when  a  regression  excludes  some  omitted  variables.  In 
robustness checks, we enlarge our conditioning set. Following Démurger (2001), we 
include  two  variables  capturing  development  of  the  local  transportation 
infrastructure
12,  Road  and  Railway.  Démurger  (2001)  constructs  an  indicator  for 
conglomerate development of road, railway and waterway for each province
13. We 
introduce Road, which measures the lagged number of kilometers of roads per square 
kilometer in one province, and its square Road
2, as well as Railway, which measures 
lagged number of kilometers of railway per square kilometer in one province, and 
Railway
2.  We  also  control  for  the  potential  congestion  problem  by  including 
Population,  which  is  the  lagged  population  density  per  square  kilometer  in  one 
province, and its interaction term with Road and Railway.   
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Table  8  reports  the  results  when  controlling  for  the  development  of  the  local 
infrastructure. While Bank Deposit and Bank Credit remain significant as reported in 
table  5  and  robust,  the  indicators  of  transportation  development  show  unclear 
correlation with growth. However, Bank Concentration and Non-bank Deposit now 
become significant in one specification (8c and 8g, respectively). In sum, the results 
in  Table  8  relieve  the  concern  of  an  omitted  variable  problem  as  adding  more 
                                                        
12  One may be concerned that the local government may have impact on banks’ lending policy. However, since the 
financial reforms in the mid-1990s, the local government can hardly intervene with the local banks.   
13  We exclude waterway because of the availability. However, we assume that development of waterway is highly 
subject to natural water resources and relatively stable during our sample period and hence can be captured by 
provincial dummy.     29
conditioning variables tends to increase the coefficients of our development variables.   
 
In  unreported  regressions,  we  also  control  for  the  effect  of  human  capital  by 
introducing schooling into our regression analysis. However, due to data availability, 
we only have schooling data for 5 years. Our results remain robust after controlling 
for schooling in small sample.   
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
Is the finance-growth nexus at work in an economy exhibiting a high growth rate? In 
this paper we address this question by providing empirical evidence on the impact of 
financial development on the growth of Chinese provinces over the period 1995-2003. 
Exploiting within variation on 27 provinces, we are able to more adequately control 
for  institutional,  legal  and  cultural  factors  that  may  commonly  affect  the  Chinese 
financial system. We find that financial development significantly positively impacts 
local economic growth recently.   
 
But  which  financial  institutions’  development  contributes  to  the  Chinese 
finance-growth nexus? We look at the impact of two types – “banks” and “non-bank 
financial institutions”. The reasoning to distinguish those two types is that banks have 
a wider geographical scope, are larger, attract higher skilled personnel, and are often 
more hierarchically organized than non-bank financial institutions. Bank branches are 
also  well  integrated  and  may  benefit  from  more  advanced  technologies  and 
centrally-developed credit systems.   
   30
We find that provinces with a greater financially developed banking sector enjoy a 
statistically  and  economically  significantly  higher  local  economic  growth
14.  Even 
though non-bank financial institutions focus more on the non-state-owned sector, we 
still find that provinces with a more developed non-bank financial sector show no 
different growth rate than provinces with a little developed non-bank financial sector. 
We  attribute  this  finding  to  the  fact  that  banks  compared  to  non-bank  financial 
institutions attract a better pool of borrowers, are technologically more advanced, and 
increased their relative exposure towards the financing of private firms. The analysis 
of  a  recent  time  period  and  the  different  findings  on  banking  development  and 
non-bank financial institutions’ development show that the finance-growth nexus also 
applies to the growth rate of Chinese provinces. 
 
While we find that banking development spurs economic growth, it remains an open 
question on whether banking development, given their state-owned nature and the 
strong  macroeconomic  management  from  the  Chinese  government,  leads  to  a 
qualitative, persistent economic growth. For example, the efficiency of the Chinese 
state-owned  banks  is  low  according  to  international  standards.  To  generate  more 
insights, further research may focus on the different efficiency between state-owned 
banks and non-state-owned banks in China and their contribution to the growth of 
different types of enterprises. We leave these questions for further research. 
                                                        
14  As the two surveys in Appendix document, the Chinese banks seem to be less prone to grant loans when firms 
are in the starting-up stage but become the most important loan providers once the firms survive and become larger. 
Hence the Chinese banks may discriminate the two different channels modeled by King and Levine (1993b), as 
illustrated in Figure 4. Specifically, banks are more likely to drop the channel of financing potential entrepreneurs 
but adopt the channel of evaluating and financing intermediate goods monopoly.   31
References 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1997. Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? 
Risk,  Diversification,  and  Growth.  Journal  of  Political  Economy  105, 
709-775. 
Aghion,  Philippe,  Howitt,  Peter,  Mayer-Foulkers,  David,  2003.  The  Effect  of 
Financial Development on Convergence:  Theory  and Evidence.  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 120, 173-222. 
Allen,  Franklin,  1990.  The  Market  for  Information  and  the  Origin  of  Financial 
Intermediaries. Journal of Financial Intermediation 1, 3-30. 
Allen, Franklin., Qian, Jun, Qian, Meijun, 2005. Law, Finance and Economic Growth 
in China. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 57-116. 
Arellano, Manuel, Bover, Olympia, 1995. Another Look at the Instrumental-Variable 
Estimation  of  Error-Components  Models.  Journal  of  Econometrics  68, 
29-52. 
Berger, Allen N., Hasan, Iftekhar, Klapper, Leora F., 2004. Further Evidence on the 
Link between Finance and Growth: An International Analysis of Community 
Banking and Economic Performance. Journal of Financial Services Research 
25, 169-202. 
Boyd, John H., E. C. Prescott, Edward C. 1986. Financial Intermediary-Coalitions, 
Journal of Economic Theory 38, 211-232. 
Boyd, John H., Smith, Bruce D., 1992. Intermediation and the Equilibrium Allocation 
of Investment Capital: Implications for Economic Development. Journal of 
Monetary Economics 30, 409-432. 
Boyd, John H., Smith, Bruce D., 1994. How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts?   32
Stochastic Versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification 
Environment. Journal of Business 67, 539-562. 
Boyreau-Debray,  Genevieve,  2003.  Financial  Intermediation  and  Growth:  Chinese 
Style. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 3027. 
Boyreau-Debray,  Genevieve,  Wei,  Shang-Jin,  2004.  Can  China  Grow  Faster?  A 
Diagnosis  of  the  Fragmentation  of  Its  Domestic  Capital  Market.  IMF 
Working Paper, WP/04/76. 
China Market Credit Management Association, 2005. Zhongguo Xinyong Nianjian 
(China Credit Yearbook), Volume I. Central Party School Press, Beijing. 
Cull, Robert, Xu, Lixin Colin, 2000. Bureaucrats, State Banks, and the Efficiency of 
Credit  Allocation:  The  Experience  of  Chinese  State-Owned  Enterprises. 
Journal of Comparative Economics 28, 1–31.   
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Maksimovic, Vojislav, 1998. Law, Finance and Firm Growth. 
Journal of Finance 53, 2107-2137. 
Démurger,  Sylvie,  2001.  Infrastructure  Development  and  Economic  Growth:  An 
Explanation  for  Regional  Disparities  in  China?  Journal  of  Comparative 
Economics 29, 95–117. 
Gale,  Douglas,  Hellwig,  Martin,  1985.  Incentive-Compatible  Debt  Contracts:  The 
One-Period Problem. Review of Economic Studies 52, 647-663. 
Goldsmith,  Raymond  W.,  1969.  Financial  Structure  and  Development.  Yale 
University Press, New Haven, CT. 
Greenwood, Jeremy, Jovanovic, Boyan, 1990. Financial Development, Growth, and 
the Distribution of Income. Journal of Political Economy 98, 1076-1107. 
Guiso,  Luigi,  Sapienza,  Paola,  Zingales,  Luigi,  2004.  Does  local  financial 
development matter? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(3), 929-969.   33
Gurley,  John  G.,  Shaw,  Edward  S.,  1955.  Financial  Aspects  of  Economic 
Development. American Economic Review 45, 515-538. 
Haber,  Stephen  H.,  1991.  Industrial  Concentration  and  the  Capital  Markets:  A 
Comparative Study of Brazil, Mexico, and  the  United  States, 1830-1930. 
Journal of Economic History 51, 559-580. 
Haber,  Stephen  H.,  1997.  Financial  Markets  and  Industrial  Development:  A 
Comparative Study of Governmental Regulation, Financial Innovation and 
Industrial Structure in Brazil and Mexico, 1840-1940. In: Haber, Stephen H. 
(Eds.), How Latin America Fell Behind? Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
CA, 146-178. 
He, Guangwen, Li, Lili, 2006. Zhenggui Jinrong Jigou Xiao’e Xindai Yunxing Jizhi ji 
Qi Jixiao Pingjia (Functioning Mechanism and Performance Assessment for 
Small Size Loans from Formal Financial Institutions). China Financial and 
Economic Publishing House, Beijing. 
Jayaratne, Jith, Strahan, Philip E., 1996. The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from 
Bank Branch Deregulation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 639-670. 
King, Robert G., Levine, Ross, 1993a. Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be 
Right. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 717-738. 
King, Robert G., Levine, Ross, 1993b. Finance, Enterpreneurship and Growth: Theory 
and Growth. Journal of Monetary Economics 32, 513-542. 
La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert 
W., 1998. Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1150. 
Levine, Ross, Loayza, Norman, Beck, Thorsten, 2000. Financial Intermediation and 
Growth: Causality and Causes. Journal of Monetary Economics 46, 31-77. 
Levine,  Ross,  Zervos,  Sara,  1998.  Stock  Markets,  Banks,  and  Economic  Growth.   34
American Economic Review 88, 537-558. 
Li,  Kui-Wai,  Liu,  Tung,  2001.  Impact  of  Liberalization  of  Financial  Resources  in 
China’s  Economic  Growth:  Evidences  from  Provinces.  Journal  of  Asian 
Economics 12, 245-262. 
Lu,  Feng,  Yao,  Yang,  2004.  Jinrong  Yayi  Xia de  Fazhi,  Jinrong  Fazhan  he Jingji 
Zengzhang  (Law,  Financial  Development  and  Economic  Growth  under 
Financial Repression). Social Sciences in China 2004(1), 42-55.   
McKinnon,  Ronald  I.,  1973.  Money  and  Capital  in  Economic  Development. 
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistics 
Yearbook), various years. China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
Park,  Albert,  Sehrt,  Kaja,  2001.  Tests  of  Financial  Intermediation  and  Banking 
Reform in China. Journal of Comparative Economics 29, 608–644. 
People’s  Bank  of  China  (PBC).  Zhongguo  Jinrong  Nianjian  (Almanac  of  China’s 
Finance and Banking), various years. China Financial Press, Beijing. 
Robinson,  Joan,  1952. The  Generalization  of  the  General  Theory.  In:  the  Rate  of 
Interest and Other Essays. MacMillan , London. 
Shaw,  Edward  S.,  1973.  Financial  Deepening  in  Economic  Development.  Oxford 
University Press, New York, NY. 
Sirri, Erik R., Tufano, Peter, 1995. The Economics of Pooling. In: Crane, Dwight B., 
Froot, Kenneth A., Mason, Scott P., Perold, André F., Merton, Robert C., 
Bodie, Zvi, Sirri, Erik R., Tufano, Peter (Eds), The Global Financial System: 
A  Functional  Perspective.  Harvard  Business  School  Press,  Boston,  MA, 
81-128. 
Stein, Jeremy C., 2002. Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized   35
vs. Hierarchical Firms. Journal of Finance 57, 1891-1921. 
Sun, Lijian, 2004. Zhongguo Jingrong Tixi de Cuiruo Xing (The Fragility in China’s 
Financial Systems). The Study of Finance and Economics 2004 (1), 61-69. 
Townsend, Robert M., 1979. Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly 
StateVerification. Journal of Economic Theory 21, 265-293. 
Wang, Sangui, Li, Yingxing, 2004. Zhongguo Xibu Diqu Nongcun Xinyongshe de 
Zhili  Jiegou,  Xingwei  yu  Yeji  (Managerial  Structure,  Conduct  and 
Performance  of  Rural  Credit  Cooperatives  in  Western  China).  Issues  in 
Agricultural Economy 2004 (6), 38-42. 
Xie, Ping, 1998. Zhongguo Fei Yinhang Jinrong Jigou Yanjiu ( A Study of the Chinese 
Non-bank Financial Institutions),    Journal of Economics and Finance 1998 
(3), 3-7, (4), 3-6, (5), 3-7. 
Xie,  Ping,  2001.  Zhongguo  Nongcun  Xinyongshe  Tizhi  Gaige  de  Zhenglun  (the 
Debate  on  the  Reform  of  China’s  Rural  Credit  Cooperatives  System). 
Journal of Financial Research 2001(1), 1-13. 
Zhang,  Qi,  2003.  Zhongguo  Nongcun  Jinrong  Xianzhang  yu  Zhengce  Fengxi 
(Analysis  of  Current  Issues  and  Policies  of  the  Chinese  Rural  Financial 
System).  In:  China  Center for  Economic Research Working  Paper  Series 
2003. China Center for Economic Research, Peking University, Beijing. 
Zhou,  Li,  Wang,  Ziming,  2002.  Zhongguo  Gediqu  Jinrong  Fanzhan  yu  Jingji 
Zengzhang  Shizheng  Fenxi,1978-2000  (Empirical  Research  of  Regional 
Financial  Development  and  Economic  Growth  in  China  (1978-2000)). 
Journal of Financial Research 2002 (10), 1-13.     
   36
































Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (1995) 
Central Bank   
Non-bank Institutions  Banks 
Urban Credit Cooperatives 
(5,229) 
Rural Credit Cooperatives 
(50,745) 
Trust and Investment   
Companies (391) 
Financial Companies 






State-Owned Banks   
(4) 
National and Regional Banks 
(11)   37




























































1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bil. RMB




Source: China Credit Yearbook (Volume I) 
 
 
   39
 
Figure 4: Channels: finance and growth model of King and Levine (1993b) 
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a : Source: Bankscope 
b : Source: Xie (2001) 
c : Operating costs ratio= operating costs/total assets 
Institutions  Operating Costs Ratio
c  Sample Period  Average Ratio 
Industrial and commercial Bank of China 
a  0.010  1996-2003 
Bank of China




 a  0.015  1996-2003 
 
0.011 
Rural Credit Cooperatives 
b  0.019  1998-1999 
Heilongjiang International Trust & Investment Corp.
 a  0.030  1997-1998 
Jiangsu International Trust & Investment Corp.
 a  0.007  1996-1997 
Shanghai AJ Trust & Investment Co, Ltd
 a  0.014  1996-2002 
Shanghai Associated Finance Co.
 a  0.008  1996-1997 
Shanghai International Trust & Investment Corp.
 a  0.022  2000-2002 
Shenzhen International Trust & Investment Corp.











Zhejiang International Trust & Investment Corp.
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Table 2: Financial risk comparison between banks and non-bank institutions 
 
Institutions  Financial Risk 
Non-performing Loan Ratios
a   
Name  2000  2001  2002  2003 
ICBC  0.334  0.298  0.257  0.213 
BOC  0.272  0.275  0.225  0.181 




ABC  0.468  0.421  0.381  0.321 
 
 
Rural Credit Cooperatives 
Average  nonperforming  loan  ratio  was  around  0.5  by  the  end  of  2003.  In  some 










Trust and Investment 
Companies 
Nonperforming Loan ratio is unreported but expected to be high. The bankruptcy of 
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company (GITIC) in 1998 is an example. 
The  Chinese  government  often  decides  to  close  the  financially  bankrupt  Trust  and 
Investment Companies.   






a : Source:    Sun (2004) 
b: Source Zhang (2003)   










Table 3: Composition of Short-term loan portfolio of the Chinese financial institutions: 1994-2002 
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Table 4: Summary statistics of growth and financial development indicators 
 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Real GDP per capita growth rate  27  .077  .013  .057  .102 
Initial GDP (initial real GDP per capita)
 a b  27  .471  .313  .143  1.592 
Per Capita Capital Stock Growth (real capital stock per capita growth rate)  27  .114  .020  .072  .145 
Real aggregate GDP growth rate  27  .088  .013  .067  .111 
Initial Aggregate GDP (initial real aggregate GDP)
 a c  27  1854.933  1397.122  141.7747  5353.567 
Aggregate Capital Stock Growth (real capital stock aggregate growth rate)  27  .121  .019  .080  .158 
Bank Deposit (bank savings to GDP)
 a  27  .843  .467  .477  2.936 
Bank Credit (bank loans to GDP)
 a  27  .683  .224  .402  1.223 
Bank Concentration (HHI based on bank deposit market shares)
 a  27  .265  .029  .222  .353 
Non-bank Deposit (non-bank savings to GDP)
 a  27  .141  .053  .049  .268 
Non-bank Credit (non-bank loans to GDP)
 a  27  .109  .041  .038  .224 
Non-bank Concentration (HHI based on non-bank deposit market shares)
 a  27  .726  .094  .549  .850 
Investment (investment to GDP)
 a  27  .455  .087  .337  .683 
FDI (FDI to GDP)
 a  27  .031  .033  .002  .110 
Road (number of kilometers of roads per square kilometer)  27  .292  .188  .027  .761 
Railway (number of kilometers of railway per square kilometer)  27  .027  .052  .002  .270 
Population (population density)
 d  27  3.678  4.515  .072  23.118 
 
a : Logarithm in regression 
b : Number in wan Yuan (10.000 RMB) 
c : Number in yi Yuan (0.1 Billion RMB) 
d : Number in bai ren (100 people) 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (1995-2003); China Statistics Yearbook (1996-2004) 
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Table 5: Finance and real per capita GDP growth in Chinese provinces: 1995-2003 
Fixed effects regressions, within estimator 
 
 
      Dependent variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth   
 
     
regressors 

































































































































































                 
Obs  242  242  242  242  242  242  242  242 
R-squared  .512  .522  .492  .500  .487  .498  .520  .524 
* indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates significance 
at 1% level; p-value is reported between brackets   45
 
Table 6: Finance and aggregate real GDP growth in Chinese province ( 1995-2003): 
aggregate capital stock growth 
Fixed effects regressions, within estimator 
 
Dependent variable: Aggregate Real GDP Growth   
 
     
regressors 































































































































































                 
Obs  242  242  242  242  242  242  242  242 
R-squared  .544  .559  .539  .539  .540  .539  .544  .560 
* indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates significance 
at 1% level; p-value is reported between brackets   46
Table 7:    Finance and real per capita GDP growth in Chinese provinces: 1995-2003 
Dynamic panel regressions, system GMM estimator 
 
    Dependent variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth   
 
     
Regressors 



























































































































































                 
Obs  215  215  215  215  215  215  215  215 
Sargan Test  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  .738  .908  .999 
AR(2) Test  .744  .585  .587  .955  .827  .504  .846  .602 
* indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates significance 
at 1% level; p-value is reported between brackets   47
 
 
Table 8: Finance and real per capita GDP growth in Chinese provinces: 1995-2003 
Fixed effects regressions, within estimator 
       
Dependent variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth   
 
     
regressors 
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Obs  242  242  242  242  242  242  242  242 
R-squared  .535  .548  .521  .528  .511  .519  .548  .551 
 
* indicates significance at 10% level ;** indicates significance at 5% level ;*** indicates significance 
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Appendix   
Table a1: The introduction to the main Chinese financial institutions 





Name  Functions 
People’s Bank of China  The  People’s  Bank  of  China  (PBOC)  is  China’s  central  bank,  which 
formulates and implements monetary policy. 
 
China Banking Regulatory 
Commission 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was officially launched on 
April 28, 2003, to take over the supervisory role of the PBOC. It regulates 
and supervises banks, asset management companies, trust and investment 
companies as well as other deposit-taking financial institutions. 
 
Stated-owned commercial banks   
The  four  Stated-owned  banks  were  established  in  the  mid-1980s  and 
transformed into commercial banks in 1994. The “big four” include:    the 
Bank  of  China  (BOC),  the  China  Construction  Bank  (CCB),  the 
Agricultural  Bank  of  China  (ABC),  and  the  Industrial  and  Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC).       
 
 
Policy banks   
The  three  policy  banks  were  established  in  1994  to  take  over  the 
government-directed  spending  functions  of  the  four  state-owned 
commercial  banks.  The  three  policy  banks  are:  the  Agricultural 
Development Bank of China (ADBC), China Development Bank (CDB), 
and the Export-Import Bank of China (Chexim) 
 
 
National and regional commercial 
banks   
National and regional commercial banks were mostly established by key 
state entities. China Minsheng Banking Corp. is the first publicly traded 
private bank. Bank of Communications is the biggest bank among all those 
banks. Although those banks are much smaller than the four state-owned 
banks, they have a much lower ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs).   
 
Credit cooperatives* 
There are two types of credit cooperatives: rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) 
and  urban  credit  cooperatives  (UCCs).  Both  of  them  are  local  financial 
institutions and aimed to extend loans for local economic activities. They 
are functionally close to commercial banks. 
 
Trust and investment companies* 
Trust and investment companies (TICs) are engaged in various forms of 
merchant  and  investment  banking  activities.  They  take  deposits  from 
inter-bank  markets.  Except  for  few  national  TICs,  most  of  them  were 
established  by  government  agencies  and  provincial  authorities  and  are 
localized.   
 
Financial companies* 
Financial companies belong to state entities. They are only allowed to take 
deposits from and grant loans to entities. 
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Surveys: The bank loans to the non-state-owned sector 
 
Survey a1 
A survey carried out by People’s Bank of China in October, 2002, shows that 47.7% of the total 
bank loans had been extended to the non-state-owned sector during the first 9 months in 2002. 
This survey covers 184 cities from 30 provinces of China, 10,804 non-state-owned enterprises and 
2,633 banks (branches) and non-bank financial institutions.   
 
Satisfaction ratios reported by banks (2002.1-2002.9) 
Institutions  Loans required (Billion RMB)  Satisfaction ratio 
State-owned banks  1138.9  84.1% 
National and regional banks  596.24  80.9% 
City commercial banks*  149.68  84.5% 
Foreign banks  122.66  75.4% 
Non-bank financial institutions  208.95  85.5% 
*transformed from urban credit cooperatives 
 
The satisfaction ratio varies among different types of applicants. For example, the satisfaction 
ratio of large non-state-owned enterprises is 85% while that of small and medium non-state-owned 
enterprises is only 69.5%. Moreover, ownership also matters for the satisfaction ratio. For instance, 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan funded enterprises have a satisfaction ratio of 88.6%, which is the 
highest  among  all  kinds  of  enterprises.  Private  enterprises,  on  the  contrary,  have  the  lowest 
satisfaction ratio of 73.8%. 
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Bonds  FDI  Stock 
markets 
35.7%  24.7%  17.4%  10.7%  8.2%  2.8%  0.6% 
 




Another survey carried out by People’s Bank of China in 2002 shows that after the deregulation of 
interest rate discrimination, bank loans become the most important sources for SMEs in Weizhou 
city, whose economic growth is typically driven by the private sector. 
 
This survey covers 190 SMEs and 13 banks and credit cooperatives in Wenzhou. The survey 
shows that 61% of the debts of the SMEs were bank loans at 2002.   
 
78% of the SMEs in the survey answered they would first go for bank loans (or credit cooperative 
loans)  when  needing  external  financing.  The  satisfaction  ratio  still  varies  between  small  and 
medium sized enterprises. For example, the satisfaction ratio of loans reported by medium sized 
enterprises is 72.7% while that reported by small sized enterprises is only 60.5%. 
 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2003) 
 